The Lucas Critique of Econometric Policy Evaluation argues that the parameters of econometric models are subject to theoretical cross-equation restrictions which follow from the fact that the endogenous variables of the models are chosen optimally by forward-looking agents. In this paper I argue that these facts alone are insufficient to generate such restrictions. I present an example of a model in which there exist multiple stationary rational expectations equilibria one of which is supported by a process-invariant forecast rule. Immunity to the Lucas Critique is proposed as a selection criterion in models with multiple equilibria.
INTRODUCTION
The Lucas Critique of Econometric Policy Evaluation has become part of every graduate student's training. According to the Lucas Critique it is inappropriate to estimate econometric models of the economy, in which endogenous variables appear as unrestricted functions of predetermined variables, if one proposes to use such models for the purpose of evaluating alternative economic policy regimes. The reason is that the estimated parameters of such a model would be functions of more fundamental "structural" parameters in combination with other parameters that describe the characteristics of the policy rule itself. Any change in policy regime would change the characteristics of the reduced-form response-of endogenous to policy variables-by altering the expectations of agents whose behaviour is summarized by the reduced-form model. In short, the parameters of unrestricted econometric models are not invariant to changes in regime.
The logic of the Lucas Critique relies on Samuelson's correspondence principle. This principle states that the endogenous variables of econometric models may be described as non-trivial functions of the exogenous variables. The application of the correspondence principle implies that a shift in policy regime (an infinite sequence of exogenous variables) will induce a shift in the equilibrium price sequence (an infinite sequence of perfectly anticipated prices).' Since agents' expectations of future prices are implicitly contained in the parameters of the reduced-form of an econometric model it follows that any change in policy regime will necessarily involve a change in these parameters.
My reservations about the general applicability of this argument are based on the fact that general equilibrium models may contain infinite numbers of indeterminate equilibria.2 In order to apply the correspondence principle to a macroeconomic model it is necessary that the equilibria of the model be locally isolated. If this is not the case, then an exogenous parameter shift may move the set of equilibria but it will leave the economist with no clear prediction about the direction of movement of the endogenous variables. An agent who lives in a world in which there is an infinite number of rational expectations equilibria will face a difficult problem deciding how to act.
Underlying this paper is the idea that agents may solve the dilemma, of how one should forecast future prices, by fixing on a rule that maps from current and past observables to expectations of future prices; that is, they will use a type of "adaptive expectations". I show, in a model in which there exist multiple rational expectations equilibria, that there is a unique rational expectations equilibrium which is supported by a process invariant forecast rule. This rule can be used to correctly forecast the probability distribution of inflation. However, the rule is independent of the parameters of the probability distribution of the fundamentals of the economy. In short, this forecast rule is immune to the Lucas Critique of Econometric Policy Evaluation. 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LUCAS CRITIQUE
2. An equilibrium is determinate if there are no other equilibria arbitrarily close to it in some appropriately chosen metric. In finite-dimensional general equilibrium models the set of competitive equilibria consists of an odd finite number of isolated equilibria. All equilibria are determinate. But there are many examples of infinite-horizon economies with a dense set of indeterminate equilibria. The overlapping-generations model is the best known of these. The paper by Kehoe and Levine (1985) contains an excellent discussion of this issue.
3. I refer to the disturbances u and v as fundamental since they enter directly into functional equations (1) and (2) that are derived from the agents' demand and supply functions. These disturbances are distinguished from non-fundamental disturbances that may affect sequences of endogenous variables that solve these equations. Disturbances of the second kind have been interpreted by sonme authors as self-fulfilling beliefs.
It is also typical to assume that the policy process represented by equation (2) 
Substituting (6) into (4) one obtains the unique rational expectations equilibrium, which describes the value of the endogenous variable Yt as a function of the contemporaneous value of the policy variable xt and of the contemporaneous disturbance term ut:
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Prior to Lucas' (1976) article it had been common practice to estimate the parameters of econometric models and to assume that these parameters would remain invariant to changes in policy regime. In the context of the model that was introduced above this practice would be equivalent to regressing Yt on xt during a period over which y was constant. This in itself is not a problem providing one does not then use this model to predict the effects on Yt of a policy intervention in which y is altered. It is clear from equation (7) that, in this particular example, the forecasts that one obtains from such an exercise will be inaccurate since they do not take account of the fact that the coefficient of xt is itself a function of the policy parameter, y. A critical step in the above argument is the assumption that the parameter a is less than 1. If this assumption is violated then it is no longer possible to describe Yt as a function of all expected future values of xt, since the infinite sum in equation (4) does not converge. This does not imply, however, that a rational expectations equilibrium does not exist. Indeed, if the parameter a is greater than 1, then one can find multiple rational expectations equilibria. Consider, for example, any process in the class:
where Et is a non-fundamental disturbance term with a conditional mean of E. It is clear that equation (1) is satisfied for any process governing the evolution of Et provided only that Et is orthoganal to the information set .t-1. It is also true that equation (8) defines a stationary process for Yt for any value of a that is greater than unity. Notice, however, that the parameters of equation (8) are independent of the parameters of the policy process, equation (2). It follows that agents who lived in an environment that was well described by this model would be able to find stable forecasting rules for future values of endogenous variables that were independent of the parameters of the policy process. An econometrician who studied such an economy could run a regression of Yt on Yt-i and xt_, and he could use this regression to analyse the effect of policy interventions in which y was altered. In short, the Lucas Critique does not hold in this environment.
A MORE GENERAL STRUCTURE
In linear models of higher dimension, it may be possible to find rational expectations equilibria in which some subset of the endogenous variables are described by equations that violate the cross-equations restrictions that characterize more traditional rational expectations models. In this section I will consider the class of linear models of the form:
This class is analysed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) who give a number of examples of economic environments that generate reduced forms with this structure. The interpretation of equation (9) is that Y' is a vector of n1 predetermined endogenous variables, y2 is a vector of n2 non-predetermined endogenous variables, Xt is an m vector of policy variables and U, is an n, + n2 set of fundamental disturbances with mean zero and covariance matrix 1,,. The terms A and B are conformable matrices of constant coefficients and fIt is the agents' common information set at date t.
As in the first-order system that I discussed in Section 2 the vector of exogenous variables Xt is assumed to be generated by a linear stochastic difference equation: 
Substituting equation (13) into (12) and making use of the convergence assumptions that the roots of F and the roots A, are all within the unit circle one arrives at the following generalization of equation (7):
where ai is the i-th element of Q-1B Ai (I - 
Since equation (17) must hold at all dates, the forecast error of each variable zi must be equal to the sum of the prediction errors of the fundamental disturbances of the model:
The q equations ( In the situation in which q = n2 this procedure delivers a unique solution. But if q < n2 then the q equations (19) and the n, restrictions EtY +I = are insufficient to uniquely determine the relationship between the n2 non-predetermined variables and their own conditional means. In this situation one is free to add arbitrary non-fundamental disturbances to n2-q of the equations (20) associated with the unstable roots of A.
THE LUCAS CRITIQUE IN HIGHER-ORDER SYSTEMS
The dimension of the set of rational expectations solutions to the general linear model depends on the relationship of q (the number of roots of the matrix A that lie within the unit circle) to n, (the number of predetermined variables). If the economic model is derived from a representative agent structure with complete markets then one will always have exactly enough stable roots to pin down the n2 free initial conditions. Models of this kind, in which the welfare theorems hold, always have locally unique equilibria because the equilibria can be derived as solutions to a social planning problem.8 Uniqueness follows from the concavity of the planner's objective function.
But there are large classes of macroeconomic models for which the welfare theorems fail. In overlapping-generations models, or in models of money with a cash-in-advance constraint, there are frequently parameterizations of the economic environment that do not uniquely determine a set of initial conditions that are consistent with rational expectations equilibrium. The implications of indeterminacy for the linear stochastic equations that describe the data is that the number of stable roots of A may be less than the number of free initial conditions, n2.
In higher-dimensional systems it is possible for there to be indeterminacy of differing degrees. For example, suppose that ni = 0; this is a case in which there are no predetermined variables. An example of an economic model in this class would be a pure trade overlapping-generations economy with multiple commodities in which the vector Yt represents relative prices. If q of the roots of the matrix A were inside the unit circle then it would be possible for the econometrician to uncover n2-q structural equations that were invariant to changes in policy regime. These structural relationships are simply the n2-q equations (20) associated with each of the unstable roots of A. In a model of this kind, however, the Lucas critique applies to the other q equations, each of which is a function of the parameters of the policy process.
Although it is possible for indeterminacy to exist in differing degrees, the most interesting class of economies is that for which the degree of indeterminacy is of the same order as the number of non-predetermined variables. In the example of a model in which n= = 0 and the n2 endogenous variables are relative prices, the existence of an indeterminate equilibrium implies that agents can find rules for forecasting future values of prices that are invariant to changes in the process that generates the sequence of exogenous variables. If the degree of indeterminacy is less than n2 there will exist rules for forecasting some subset of linear combinations of future prices but it is not clear that this case is interesting. A regime change in an economy in which the degree of indeterminacy is less than n2 will still force agents to change their forecasting rules, since a subset of linear combinations of prices provides insufficient information to agents at date t to determine their actions. 
A SIMPLE ECONOMIC EXAMPLE
The subscript i on the parameters 4' and a denotes the values of these parameters at the non-stochastic stationary states xi, for i = 1, 2. One may show that the value of ai at the two stationary states is respectively greater than and less than unity; that is:
It follows that this model describes a world in which there are multiple stationary rational-expectations equilibria. In light of my discussion in Section 2, one of these equilibria-the stationary stochastic rational-expectations equilibrium that is associated with the steady state of the non-stochastic model x2-is locally unique. But associated with the steady state xl, there will exist a continuum of stationary rational-expectations equilibria.
DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS TO THIS EXAMPLE
The usual approach to linear rational-expectations modelling is to impose the inequality O < a < 1 as a theoretical restriction. It is typically argued that some restriction of this kind must follow from the transversality conditions of an individual agent's optimizing problem. If one takes this approach then the backwards instability of the perfect-foresight dynamics in the neighbourhood of a steady state operates as a uniqueness criterion.9 There are many stochastic difference equations that satisfy equation (26) As an example of a model in which the restriction 0 < a < 1 may be violated consider the linearized version of the Cagan hyperinflation model around the non-stochastic steady state ml. At this steady state, the functional equation that characterizes equilibrium sequences is well approximated by a linear stochastic difference equation in which the coefficient of the future expected value of the state variable is greater than unity. That is; a, in equation (26) 
(28)
Using this rule to predict future prices, it follows from equation (21) that the demand for money in period t will be given by the expression:
Pt Pt/ It follows further, from equation (22), that the supply of money will be given by the equation:
Equating demand and supply one obtains the following expression:
Pt Pt-I which determines the price level in period t. Notice that, from lagging equation (29) and substituting it into the right-hand-side of (31), this equilibrium condition implies that if agents use the forecast rule given by equation (28) to predict future prices, that the rule will be self-fulfilling. That is, the sequence of actual prices will be given by the same equation as the forecast rule. In a standard linear rational-expectations model, a forecast rule of this kind is inconsistent with a stationary equilibrium since the difference equation (28) will diverge from the stationary state Y2. But in the non-linear economy the forecast rule may cause prices to converge to a different rational-expectations equilibrium around the stationary state il. Under reasonable assumptions about the support of the distribution of gt the 9. By "backwards instability" I mean that the difference equation that characterizes perfect-foresight price sequences, P,+1 =f(P,), diverges for a given initial condition, PO = P, in the neighbourhood of the stationary state.
forecast rule (28) will cause the inflation rate to converge to a stationary distribution around the non-stochastic stationary state vj(g). Furthermore, this forecast rule will be rational in the sense that if agents use the rule to forecast prices, then actual prices will be described by the same conditional distribution as forecast prices.
SUNSPOT EQUILIBRIA
The existence of backward-looking equilibria of the kind outlined above has been known for some time. Typically, however, these equilibria are perceived to represent a problem for the rational expectations research agenda that must somehow be resolved. The problem arises from the fact that there exist not one, but many, stochastic rational-expectations equilibria around a stationary state of the perfect-foresight model for which the perfectforesight dynamics are stable. For example, in the above model, suppose that agents use the forecast rule: (35) Pt Pt-,\Pt-, Equation (35) affirms that the forecast rule given in (32) is self-fulfilling in the sense that if agents use this rule to forecast prices in period t + 1, then the same rule will determine prices in period t. But since the sunspot variable et is arbitrary, there are many rationalexpectations equilibria of this kind. Furthermore, since all of these equilibria are described by Markov processes which converge to a bounded interval, all of them can be described by invariant distributions; that is, as stationary rational expectations equilibria.'0 It is for this reason that many economists are reluctant to accept sunspot equilibria as positive models of economic phenomena.
IMMUNITY TO THE LUCAS CRITIQUE AS A SELECTION CRITERION FOR ECONOMIES WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
Monetary economies typically contain multiple equilibria. Most authors who use monetary equilibrium models to analyse practical problems have dealt with this issue by 10. For a much more complete analysis of this argument in the context of a fully-specified maximizing model see Farmer and Woodford (1984) . This paper establishes the existence of invariant distributions for the endogenous variables of a model that is very similar to the one discussed above, using the results of Futia (1982) .
choosing the parameters of their models to reflect the assumption that there exists a unique determinate stationary monetary equilibrium. This research strategy allows one to make concrete predictions about movements in the endogenous variables of the model in response to changes in the exogenous variables. But it is not the only way of selecting a model that makes determinate predictions. Any rule that picks a particular equilibrium will also imply that prices move in predictable ways when exogenous variables change. The predictions will not necessarily be the same as those that follow from a model that picks a determinate steady state but they will have just as much empirical content.
There have been numerous attempts to narrow down the number of equilibria in models of the kind that I have outlined above." For example, the papers by Evans (1986) and Marcet and Sargent (1989) argue that a particular equilibrium should be selected if one can show that some plausible learning mechanism converges to it. This strategy has been used most often to isolate a unique determinate steady state'2 although many monetary models may possess an alternative equilibrium that is of independent interest. This equilibrium is one that is supported by a forecast rule that is invariant to changes in the distribution functions of future values of the exogenous variables of the model; a 'Lucas proof' equilibrium.
The Cagan model contains a unique 'Lucas proof' equilibrium supported by a backward looking forecast rule, equation (32), in which the sunspot variables e, are set equal to zero. Sunspots cannot affect forecasts because the sunspot forecast rule, depends on the mean of the distribution of e. This dependence implies that if the distribution of the sunspot variable changes in an unpredictable way then the forecast rule described by (32) will turn out, ex-post, to have been inaccurate. Sunspot variables must be treated in the same way as other exogenous variables.
What, if anything, should we learn from this example. The response of some readers will undoubtedly be that it is a theoretical curiosum that does not merit serious consideration. This conclusion is suggested by the fact that the model of choice for a good part of the profession, the representative-agent paradigm, does not contain equilibria of the kind that I have described. It cannot contain such equilibria since there is a direct equivalence in models with a finite number of infinitely-lived agents between the set of competitive equilibria and the solution to an appropriately specified planner's problem. This equivalence allows one to rule out indeterminate steady states by appealing to the transversality conditions of a programming problem.
Whilst it is correct to assert that the representative-agent paradigm in its strictest form cannot contain the type of equilibria that I have described, small depatures from this structure do display such equilibria. In particular the attempt to include money in the representative agent model using a cash-in-advance constraint leads directly to the type of model that I have analysed in this paper.'3 The two-period overlapping-generations model is well known to possess a stable equilibrium of the kind required to construct a 11. McCallum (1983), Taylor (1977) and Evans (1985 Evans ( , 1986 represent just a few of the solutions that have previously been proposed to the problem; the book by Whiteman (1983) is also a good source of material on this issue.
12. Woodford (1990) is an exception. He shows that agents who use an out of equilibrium learning rule may come to believe in a sunspot equilibrium. It is an open question as to whether a Lucas-proof forecast rule can be supported by out-of-equilibrium learning dynamics although I believe that there exist robust examples in which this is the case.
13. The paper by Wilson (1979) was the first work that I know of which analyses the dynamics of a model of this kind in depth. Wilson shows that the cash-in-advance constraint allows one to reduce the dynamics of an infinite-horizon model to first-order difference equation in real balances which behaves a lot like the two-period overlapping-generations model. Woodford (1986a) uses a similar technique to construct sunspot equilibria. Lucas (1984) , on the other hand, is careful to introduce sufficient structure to rule out such equilibria.
Lucas-proof forecast rule and more general versions of the overlapping-generations economy possess similar properties.
Whether or not the arguments that I have presented prove to be persuasive will depend in large part on whether one is able to develop tractable macroeconomic models in which the criterion that I suggest for selecting equilibria is useful. It is my suspicion that many researchers have remained skeptical of studying models with multiple equilibria because it is widely believed that they do not lead to refutable predictions.14 One obvious way out of this dilemma is to isolate one of the possible equilibria of a model and to confront the implied predictions of this equilibrium with data. The equilibrium that I propose is one possible candidate which has clearly different implications for the behaviour of time-series data from that of standard rational-expectations models. 
APPENDIX

